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5 What's in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying Expectations

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INTRODUCTION

I have been struck lately by the recurrence of a single theme in a wide variety of contexts: the power of expectation. For example, the self-fulfilling prophecy has been proven to operate in education as well as in individual psychology. I happened to leaf through a how-to-succeed book; its thesis was that the way to succeed is to expect to do so. Two months ago at a conference for teachers of English as a second language, the keynote speaker explained that effective reading is a process of anticipating what the author is going to say and expecting it as one reads. Moreover, there are general platitudes heard every day, as for example the observation that what is wrong with marriage today is that partners expect too much of each other and of marriage.

The emphasis on expectation seems to corroborate a nearly self-evident truth: in order to function in the world, people cannot treat each new person, object, or event as unique and separate. The only way we can make sense of the world is to see the connections between things, and between present things and things we have experienced before or heard about. These vital connections are learned as we grow up and live in a given culture. As soon as we measure a new perception against what we know of the world from prior experience, we are dealing with expectations.

The notion of expectations is at the root of a wave of theories and studies in a broad range of fields, including linguistics. It is this notion, I believe, which underlies talk about frames, scripts, and schemata in the fields of linguistics, artificial intelligence,cognitive psychology, social psychology, sociology, and

anthropology at least (and I would not be surprised if similar terms were used in other disciplines I do not happen to know about). In this chapter I will illustrate a way of showing the effects of these "structures of expectation" on verbalization in the telling of oral narratives. Before I proceed, however, it will be useful to give a brief sketch of the various ways in which these terms have been used in the fields I have mentioned.

Because of the infinite confusion possible as a result of the great number of authors and contexts we will need to discuss, I will categorize the main theorists first according to the disciplines they work in, and then according to their choice of terms.

In the field of psychology we need to consider the work of Bartlett (1932), Rumelhart (1975), and Abelson (1975, 1976). Rumelhart is a cognitive psychologist and Abelson a social psychologist, but both have become increasingly associated with the field of artificial intelligence. In the latter field, Abelson works closely with Schank (Schank & Abelson, 1975). The second major researcher in this field is Minsky (1974). Linguists we will consider are Chafe (1977a, b) and Fillmore (1975, 1976). In anthropology, the names of Bateson (1972) (his work was originally published in 1955) and Frake (1977) must be noted, as well as Hymes (1974) who may more precisely be called an ethnographer of speaking (to use the term he himself coined). In sociology the theorist is Goffman (1974).

Let us now consider the above scholars in groups according to the terms they prefer to use. The term "schema" traces back to Bartlett (1932) in his pioneering book, *Remembering* (Bartlett himself borrows the term from Sir Henry Head). This term has been picked up by Chafe as well as Rumelhart, and by others, as for example Bobrow and Norman (1975), who are also in the field of artificial intelligence. The term "script" is associated with the work of Abelson and Schank. The term "frame" is associated most often with the anthropological/sociological orientation of Hymes, Goffman, and Frake, and with the artificial intelligence research of Minsky. Their use of the term stems from Bateson. "Frame" is also used by Fillmore, who notes that he came to it by a different route, that of the structuralist notion of syntagmatic frame.

To complicate matters further, a number of these writers use more than one term (Fillmore: scene-and-frame; Chafe: schema, frame, and categorization), or express dissatisfaction with the term they use (Bartlett writes that he would really prefer "active developing patterns" or "organized setting"; Fillmore says he would prefer "module").

To uncomplicate matters, however, all these complex terms and approaches amount to the simple concept of what R. N. Ross (1975) calls "structures of expectations," that is, that, based on one's experience of the world in a given culture (or combination of cultures), one organizes knowledge about the world and uses this knowledge to predict interpretations

and relationships regarding new information, events, and experiences. Bartlett (1932), the earliest of the theorists discussed here and the first psychologist to use the term "schema," in effect said it all:"...the past operates as an organized mass rather than as a group of elements each of which retains its specific character" (p. 197).

Bartlett's concern, as his title indicates, is "Remembering"; he relies heavily on Head's notion of "schema" (quoting extensively from a book entitled *Studies in neurology*) (Head, 1920) in order to support his theory that memory is constructive rather than consisting of the storage of all previously perceived stimuli. Bartlett contends that an individual "has an overmastering tendency simply to get a general impression of the whole; and, on the basis of this, he constructs the probable detail" (p. 206). One more aspect of Bartlett's work that is particularly significant, in his estimation as well as mine, is the "whole notion, that the organized mass results of past changes of position and posture are actively *doing* something all the time; are, so to speak, carried along with us, complete, though developing, from moment to moment" (p. 201). This is the aspect of schemata which he felt was lost in that term, and it is for this reason that he preferred the terms "active, developing patterns." Bartlett's apprehensions about the term "schema" were obviously justified, for in most of this work, the notion of constant change has been lost. For example, Charniak (1975), an AI investigator who follows Minsky, states, "I take a frame to be a static data structure about one stereotyped topic..." (p. 42).

Perhaps the most direct descendent of Bartlett is Chafe (who, although he does not specifically emphasize the dynamic nature of schemata, does not imply a necessarily static notion of them either, perhaps because as a linguist he is not so much subject to the computer metaphor). In fact, as Bartlett investigated the nature of memory by reading passages to groups of subjects and having them recall them at later intervals, so Chafe (1977a, b) has been studying the recall of events by showing a film to groups of subjects and having them retell what they saw at later intervals (in fact, these data are the basis of the present paper).

As a linguist, however, Chafe (1977a) is interested in verbalization. He posits the question: after witnessing or experiencing an event, "What kinds of processes must this person apply to convert his knowledge, predominantly nonverbal to begin with, into a verbal output?" (p. 41). The first element in this process, he hypothesizes, is the determination of a schema, which refers to the identification of the event; the second is the determination of a frame, which refers to the sentence-level expression about particular individuals and their roles in the event; finally, a category is chosen to name objects or actions which play parts in the event. For all these choices, one must "match the internal representation of particular events and individuals with internally represented prototypes" (p. 42).

Since we are encountering the term "prototype" here, it is as good a time as any to note that this is another currently popular term which is inextricably intertwined with the notion of expectations. As Fillmore (1975) notes, the "prototype idea can be seen in the color term studies of B. Berlin and P. Kay (1969) and in the 'natural category' researches of E. Rosch (1973)" (p. 123). Fillmore lists a number of other related concepts as well from a variety of disciplines. The prototype, like the frame, refers to an expectation about the world, based on prior experience, against which new experiences are measured and interpreted.

Returning to our discussion of the uses of the term "schema," we may note the work of Rumelhart (1975), who devises a schema for stories in the interest of developing an automatic "story parser" for artificial intelligence consumption. Rumelhart acknowledges his debt to Schank as well as Propp (1958).

To give one final example of how the notion of schemata has been used in AI, we refer to Bobrow and Norman (1975), who "propose that memory structures [in a computer] be comprised of a set of active schemata, each capable of evaluating information passed to it and capable of passing information and requests to other schemata" (p. 148). Their association of schemata with automatic processes seems to reflect faithfully the function of expectations: "Any time there is a mismatch between data and process or expectations and occurrences, conscious processes are brought in" (p. 148). This reflects, then, the way in which a person's perception of the world proceeds automatically so long as expectations are met, while s/he is stopped short, forced to question things, only when they are not.

Abelson's interest in scripts spans three fields: ideology, story understanding (that is, for the purpose of computer simulation), and social behavior (talk at UC Berkeley, March 1977). Abelson's broad interests render his work on scripts particularly interesting. He became interested in scripts, he explains, in connection with the predictability he discerned in Goldwater's belief system! Among the most interesting of the perspectives Abelson (1976) investigates is the relationship between scripts, attitudes, and behavior: "In our view, attitude toward an object consists in the ensemble of scripts concerning that object" (p. 16). He notes, therefore, that it is interesting to talk about scripts when there is a clash between how people behave and how you might expect them to behave. An understanding of their scripts, then, explains the link between attitudes and behavior.

In the area of story understanding, Abelson has worked alongside Schank. They note that their notion of script is like Minsky's notion of frames, "except that it is specialized to deal with event sequences" (Schank & Abelson, 1975). In fact, for Schank and Abelson, *script* is only one form of knowledge structure; it is their aim to define others as well. Their latest book (Schank & Abelson, 1977) differentiates between scripts, plans, goals, and themes, which, they note, are explained in descending order of clarity. It should be noted, perhaps, that earlier papers make other distinctions. In Abelson (1975), there are script, theme ("a conceptual structure which accounts for a number of related scripts..."), and dreme ("a conception of the possibility that one or more themes are subject to change") (p. 275). In Abelson (1976), "The basic ingredient of scripts we label a *vignette*" (p. 2). Finally, Schank and Abelson (1975) distinguish two kinds of scripts: situational and planning scripts. Planning scripts are said to "describe the set of choices that a person has when he sets out to accomplish a goal" (p. 154), and therefore seem identical to what they now define as a separate knowledge structure called a plan. The situational script seems to be what they now simply call "script," that is, a familiar, causally connected sequence of intentional (goal-oriented) events (Abelson talk, UC Berkeley, March 1977).

Schank and Abelson's (1975) notion of script is best characterized by their example of the restaurant script. They illustrate the existence of scripts in knowledge structures by presenting the following sort of story:

> John went into the restaurant. He ordered a hamburger and a coke. He asked the waitress for the check and left.

One might ask how the story can refer to *"the"* waitress and *"the"* check "just as if these objects had been previously mentioned." The fact that they can is evidence of the existence of a script which "has implicitly introduced them by virtue of its own introduction" (p. 4.)

It remains now for us to examine the notion of *frame*. As mentioned above, this term has probably the widest distribution, occurring in the work of Bateson and Frake in anthropology, Hymes and Goffman in sociology, Minsky in artificial intelligence, and Fillmore in linguistics.

Bateson introduced the notion of *frame* in 1955 to explain how individuals exchange signals that allow them to agree upon the level of abstraction at which any message is intended. Even animals can be seen to use frames to interpret each other's behavior, by signaling, for example, "This is play." Bateson (1972) insists that "frame" is a psychological concept, but to characterize it, he uses "the physical analogy of the picture frame and the more abstract... analogy of the mathematical set" (p. 186).

In his work on the ethnography of speaking, which seeks to analyze language as it is used by people in specific cultures, Hymes (1974) includes frames as one of the "means of speaking." In order to interpret utterances in accordance with the way in which they were intended, a hearer must know what "frame" s/he is operating in, that is, whether the activity being engaged in is joking, imitating, chatting, lecturing, or performing a play, to name just a

few possibilities familiar to our culture. This notion of frames as a culturally determined, familiar activity is consonant with the term as used by Goffman (1974) and Frake (1977).

Frake traces the cognitive anthropological use of "frame" to structural linguistics and credits his field with having broadened the concept from its linguistic application to isolated sentences to a sequence of conversational exchange. Frake goes on to complain, however, of the very misconception that Bartlett cautioned against and which we have noted in the work of the artificial intelligence theorists, that is, the idea that people have in their heads fully-formed "cognitive ideolects" which can be described and which add up to "culture." In other words, he is opposing a static notion of frames in favor of an interactive model. He notes that anthropologists had come to refer to "eliciting frames," as if they were there and had merely to be tapped. Frake suggests instead, and this is an approach basic to the work of John Gumperz and other ethnographers of speaking, that the key aspect of frames is what the people are *doing* when they speak. He discusses the notion of *event* which seems to correspond to what Gumperz (1977) calls an *activity* as the unit of study: an identifiable interactional happening that has meaning for the participants. Thus the anthropological/sociological view stresses *frame* as a relational concept rather than a sequence of events; it refers to the dynamic relationship between people, much like Bartlett's (1932) "organized mass" of past experience which is "actively *doing* something all the time" (p. 201, italics his). Frake (1977) ends his paper with the extended metaphor of people as mapmakers whose "culture does not provide a cognitive map, but rather a set of principles for mapmaking and navigation," resulting in "a whole chart case of rough, improvised, continually revised sketch maps" (pp. 6-7). This metaphorical chart case seems awfully like a set of overlapping, intertwining, and developing scripts.

In contrast with the anthropological/sociological characterization of frames as an interactional unit with social meaning, Minsky's (1974) is a static concept, rooted in the computer model of artificial intelligence. Acknowledging his debt to Schank and Abelson, Bartlett, Piaget, and others, Minsky propounds the notion of frame as an all-inclusive term for "a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation" (p. 212). For Minsky, this term denotes such event sequences as a birthday party (corresponding to Schank and Abelson's restaurant script), but also ordered expectations about objects and setting (for example, a certain kind of living room). Minsky distinguishes between at least four levels of frames: surface syntactic frames ("mainly verb and noun structures"), surface semantic frames (seemingly corresponding to Fillmore's notion of case frame), thematic frames ("scenarios"), and narrative frames (apparently comparable to Schank and Abelson's scripts). Although Minsky's explication of the frame theory, which appeared in 1974 as a memo from the MIT AI Lab does not constitute much theoretical innovation

beyond the work of Bartlett and others we have seen who followed him, yet it represents a particularly coherent, complete, and readable formulation of the theory, and perhaps for this reason it has had resounding impact on the field of AI as well as on many other disciplines.

Fillmore, too, has chosen the term "frame," and it is perhaps fitting to end with his treatment of this material, for his short paper (1975) brings all these ideas into focus in connection with linguistics. He begins with a listing of theories of Prototype and Frame from a variety of disciplines. Fillmore uses nearly all the terms we have discussed somewhere in his paper (except "scripts"). His thesis is that a frame-and-scene analysis of language can elucidate hitherto fuzzy areas of linguistics. He uses "the word *frame* for any system of linguistic choices... that can get associated with prototypical instances of scenes" and the word *scene* for "any kind of coherent segment of human beliefs, actions, experiences or imaginings" (p. 124). Furthermore, "people associate certain *scenes* with certain linguistic *frames*" (p. 2). Fillmore then shows how this approach to meaning is useful in three areas: (1) analysis of discourse, (2) acquisition of word meaning, and (3) the boundary problem for linguistic categories.

These, then, have been the major theories making use of notions of frames, schemata, and scripts. They may all be seen, in some sense, to be derived from Bartlett. It may be useful, before proceeding to our data, to consider one more research tradition which also can be seen to derive from Bartlett, and to be related to the concept of structures of expectation, even though it does not employ the specific terms we have been investigating. This is the work of the constructive memory theorists in cognitive psychology.

Research in this tradition has demonstrated the effect of context on memory performance tasks. The first of these was Pompi and Lachman (1967) who showed the superior performance on memory tasks of subjects who had read a passage in coherent order over those who had read a scrambled version of it. Even more striking, however, is the research of Bransford and his co-workers (Bransford & Franks, 1971; Bransford & Johnson, 1973). They showed that subjects were unable to recall well a passage which contained only pronouns and described a series of actions. When the same passage was read, however, under the title which identified the sequence of actions as, for example, someone washing clothes, subjects were able to recall it well. In the terms we have been considering, we might say that the title identified the sequence of events as a familiar script, or that it fit the activity into a known frame.

Similar evidence lies in the research of Anderson and Ortony (1975). They presented subjects with sentences like, for example, "The woman was waiting outside the theater." After reading a list of such sentences to subjects, they tried to elicit the sentences by using one-word cues. It was found that context-associated words which did not actually appear in the sentences were better

cues than context-free words which actually were in the sentence. In other words, in the sentence given, "actress" was a better cue than "woman," even though the word "woman" actually was in the target sentence while "actress" was not. This is reminiscent of the Schank and Abelson restaurant script hypothesis, which pointed to the fact that a waitress could be treated as given when no waitress had been mentioned.

What unifies all these branches of research is the realization that people approach the world not as naive, blank-slate receptacles who take in stimuli as they exist in some independent and objective way, but rather as experienced and sophisticated veterans of perception who have stored their prior experiences as "an organized mass," and who see events and objects in the world in relation to each other and in relation to their prior experience. This prior experience or organized knowledge then takes the form of expectations about the world, and in the vast majority of cases, the world, being a systematic place, confirms these expectations, saving the individual the trouble of figuring things out anew all the time.

At the same time that expectations make it possible to perceive and interpret objects and events in the world, they shape those perceptions to the model of the world provided by them. As Bartlett put it, one forms a general impression (we might say, one labels something as part of a certain scene, frame, or script) and furnishes the details which one builds from prior knowledge (that is, from the script). Thus, structures of expectation make interpretation possible, but in the process they also reflect back on perception of the world to justify that interpretation.

All these theories have referred to frames and other structures of expectation, but they have shown no way of discovering what those structures consist of, for they have been mainly concerned with language comprehension. In this chapter, I would like to consider how expectations affect language production, and, in the process, show a way of discovering what constitutes them—that is, to show how we can know what's in a frame.

DATA FOR THE PRESENT STUDY

In connection with a project directed by Wallace Chafe, a movie was shown to small groups of young women who then told another woman (who they were told had not seen the film) what they had seen in the movie. The film was a six-minute short, of our own production, which included sound but no dialogue. It showed a man picking pears from a tree, then descending and dumping them into one of three baskets on the ground. A boy comes by on a bicycle and steals a basket of pears. As he's riding away, he passes a girl on a bike, his hat flies off his head, and the bike overturns. Three boys appear and help him

gather his pears. They find his hat and return it to him, and he gives them pears. The boys then pass the farmer who has just come down from the tree and discovered that his basket of pears is missing. He watches them walk by eating pears.

This film was shown and this procedure followed in ten different countries. I oversaw the administration of the experiment in Athens, Greece and have studied the Greek narratives.[1] In describing the events and people in the movie, subjects organized and altered the actual content of the movie in many ways. The ways in which they did this are evidence of the effect of their structures of expectation about objects and events in the film. The comparison of narratives told by Greek and American subjects makes it possible to see that these structures are often culturally determined, as one would expect.

On the basis of this hypothesis, I have isolated sixteen general types of evidence which represent the imposition of the speakers' expectations on the content of the film. These are not absolute categories, and certainly this is not a definitive list, yet they cover a broad range of linguistic phenomena, and they represent a way in which structures of expectation can be characterized.

Labov (1972) discusses a series of surface linguistic phenomena in oral narratives which he calls "evaluative." They are "the means used by the narrator to indicate the point of the narrative," or to answer in advance the question, "So what?" Since the point of a narrative is directly related to the expectations of people in the culture in which it is told, it is not surprising that Labov's evaluative elements are closely related to my notion of evidence of expectations. I will note these similarities as they arise in the following discussion.

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[1]No attempt was made, in gathering our narratives, to find "equivalent" or "comparable" subject populations from the point of view of socioeconomic status or other external variable besides age and sex. Our interest was in exploring *different* approaches to verbalization of events in the same film. While it is tempting to hypothesize that the differences are culturally-based, this need not be the case to demonstrate that there are consistent differences in the way these two groups of subjects approached the verbalization task. It may be noted briefly, however, that the twenty American subjects were students at the University of California, Berkeley, while the twenty Greek subjects were attending evening classes in the English language at the Hellenic American Union in Athens. Seven were university students, two were university graduates, six were high school students, and four were employed high school graduates. The American subjects were slightly older, ranging in age from 18 to 30 with a median of 23, while the Greeks ranged in age from 16 to 26 with a median of 19. Virtually all the American subjects had been raised in cities, and most of the Greeks had been born and raised in Athens, except for one from Istanbul and four from Greek towns. It might be noted, however, that a typical Athenian has closer ties with rural life than do American city-dwellers, as Athenians often make "excursions" to the villages and most have relatives living in the countryside whom they visit regularly.

LEVELS OF FRAMES

Any speech event represents the overlapping and intertwining of many relations concerning the context as well as the content of communication. In the case of the oral narratives under study here, the larger context is the one in which the speaker is the subject of an experiment, and the context in which that experiment is being carried out is an interview mode, in which the speaker knows that her voice is being tape-recorded. Clearly, the speaker's expectations about being the subject of an experiment in an academic setting, and her feelings about having her voice recorded, affect her narrative performance.

The contentof the story, furthermore, is the narration of events in a film, so the speaker's expectations about films as well as her expectations of herself as a film viewer also come into play. Finally, the events, objects, and people depicted in the film trigger expectations about similar events, objects, and people in the real world and their interrelationships. All these levels of knowledge structures coexist and must operate in conjunction with each other to determine how the events in the film will be perceived and then verbalized. In the following discussion, I will consider these various levels of expectation structures in turn, in order of scope (that is, from the overriding context, subject of experiment, to the relatively narrow object level) and in each case I will demonstrate how the expectations are revealed in surface evidence of the types I have been looking at. In cases in which there are significant differences between Greek and American responses, that will be noted. After expectations have been seen to operate on these various levels, I will list the sixteen types of evidence used in the preceding discussion and explain and exemplify each. In a final section, I will discuss the elements of one specific set of expectations, that is, parts of the narratives relating to the occurrence of a theft.

SUBJECT OF EXPERIMENT

The broadest level of context operating in the film narratives relates to the situation in which the speakers find themselves. As subjects of an experiment, they are telling a story to a person they have never met before.[2] They do not know the purpose of the experiment, so they do not know what elements in their story will be of interest to the hearer. This is clearly an unnatural context for storytelling. The fact that it is an experiment situation may well affect

[2]The interviewer was of the same sex and similar age, to minimize the discomfort caused by this situation.

every aspect of the telling, although it is also likely that the speakers have told stories and told plots of films so often that they lapse into a habitual narrative mode. It is, nonetheless, a context in which the speakers are subjects of the experiment, and they reveal expectations about that situation in their talk.

On the average, the American narratives are longer and more detailed than the Greek ones. It is possible that this is a function of the Americans' assumptions about the experiment situation. That is, not knowing the purpose of the experiment, they may feel that the more details they give, the more likely they will include what is wanted. Moreover, they may have an instinctive feeling that it is a memory test. A number of American subjects overtly express their discomfort about how much detail to include (some repeatedly), while a few Greeks ask at the beginning but do not return to the issue. For example, S34 says

> S34 (45) ...and then– UM...just..how..I mean how picky do you want.[3]

Another American subject expresses regret that she does not remember more details:

> S49 (55) ...That's all I remember. You should have caught me ...ten minutes ago when I remembered... Who passed the ...the man before the kid on the bicycle, I don't remember.

The use of a *negative statement* is one of the clearest and most frequent indications that an expectation is not being met. As Labov (1972) puts it, "What reason would the narrator have for telling us that something did not happen since he is in the business of telling us what did happen?" He explains, "...it expresses the defeat of an expectation that something would happen" (pp. 380–81). I have demonstrated this in a natural narrative (Tannen, 1977) elsewhere, and numerous examples will be seen in this paper as well. In the above example, the negative statement "I don't remember" indicates the

[3]The number following S (in this case S34) refers to the subject number. The number in parentheses refers to a "chunk" number, in accordance with a process of chunking utterances developed in the Chafe project. Other conventions of transcription:

...is a measurable pause, more than .1 sec. Precise measurements have been made and are available.
.. is a slight break in timing.
. indicates sentence-final intonation.
, indicates clause-final intonation ("more to come")
-- indicates length of the preceding phoneme or syllable.
Syllables with˝ were spoken with heightened pitch.
Syllables with¨ were spoken with heightened loudness.
/ / enclose transcriptions which are not certain.
[ ] enclose phonemic transcriptions or nonverbal utterances such as laughter.

speaker's expectation that she should have remembered the characters in the film in order to tell about them.

The fact that the speaker is wondering about the purpose of the experiment shows up in another narrative in this way:

S39 (169) ... If this is for gestures, this is a great movie for gestures.

The non-syntactic anaphora (Gensler, 1977), "this," refers to the experiment, indicating that this "frame" has been in the speaker's mind even though she has not mentioned it overtly. Moreover, twelve Americans begin their narratives with "Okay," and three others with "All right" or "Sure," implying that they are agreeing to fulfill a request.[4] Two American subjects and one Greek indicate that they have kept this frame in mind, for they end their narratives by asking "Okay?" (Greek: *endaxi?*), which seems to be asking, "Is that what you wanted?"

Even though the storytelling is occurring in an experiment situation, it is an interaction between two people, both women, of roughly the same age and class. Thus it is inevitable that the speakers' habitual conversational expectations come into play. This can be seen in the following example. S37's storytelling mode is automatically triggered, but it conflicts with the interview conventions which require that the subject answer questions rather than the interviewer, and that the subject, moreover, conform to the rules established by the addressee. S37 has just made a statement which is a *judgment* about the sounds in the film. Since a judgment is clearly a comparison of the events of the film to her own expectations, she instinctively wants to check out her judgment with the addressee, who she knows has heard about the film from other speakers as well.

S37 (24) ... has anybody told you that before? Or r you're not supposed to tell me that.

S37 acknowledges the constraint of the interview situation by her negative statement, "you're not supposed to tell me that." Two more sorts of evidence of expectations can be seen here: the appearance of the *modal*, "be supposed to," lexically measures the addressee's actions against expected norms (Labov discusses modals as "evaluative" as well). Finally, the false start is a frequent occurrence in oral narratives which indicates the operation of expectations. The false start in this example, "r," is minimal, but it seems that the aborted "r" was intended to begin the phrasing, "Are you allowed to tell me?" The speaker's decision to switch to a negative statement seems to be evidence that she recalled the interview situation and its attendant constraints.

[4]Nine Greek subjects began by saing *Nai*, "Yes." The others simply launched into their narratives. This coincides with my findings (Tannen, 1976) that *nai*, commonly translated "yes," in fact is often used more like the English "okay" or "yeah" than the English "yes."

STORYTELLING FRAME

For some subjects, awareness of the experiment situation seems less overriding than for others. For example, S4 gives the following reason for including details in her narrative.

S4 (52) ... I'm giving you all these details. I don't know if you want them. ... UM--... the... reason I'm giving you the details is cause I don't know what the point of the movie was. ... Okay? So maybe you can see something that I didn't. ... Okay? /laugh/

S4 apparently feels that when telling about a movie, she should know and communicate what "the point" was. Her inability to do this creates enough discomfort for her to mention it as a reason for telling details. She seems to feel, moreover, that it is odd for her to tell details without fitting them into some structure or "point." Her statement about the interviewer's ability to make sense of the details (note again the modal, "can") indicates that she is operating on a cooperative model in which she assumes her purpose is to communicate to her hearer. This is somewhat different from the expectation of a purpose of furnishing data for an unidentified researcher.

A similar expectation about the reasonableness of the hearer shows up in S39.

S39 (124) don't say yes, because you don't you've never seen that /??/. All right. Okay.

All subjects had been told that the person they were telling their story to had not seen the film. Therefore, S39 expects the hearer to act like an ignorant addressee. Similarly, S47 asks:

S47 (20) ... AH-- would you like to know what... the goat looked like? [*thiyə*]? I hate to take away the suspe--nse or anything.

This statement reveals the expectation that limits the amount one ought to tell about a film to someone who has not seen the film and intends to, since part of film-viewing involves not knowing any more than the film itself has shown you, or "suspense." Thus S47 is approaching the telling task from a "film-telling" frame rather than from an "interview-for-experiment" frame, such as the one which causes S34 to ask, "how picky do you want?"

There are a number of ways in which subjects reveal that they have expectations about how to tell a story. For example, it is clear that they feel they should tell only important elements. However, since they are not sure what they are telling the story for, they cannot always judge whether elements are important. This discomfort is verbalized, making that expectation overt.

S4 (15) .. he's wearing like an apron with huge pockets. .. But I don't think you see the apron at first. I don't know if that's important or not.

S4 (152) ... Who looks like a Mexican-American if that's important?

S34 (79) ... And I don't know if this--... really is important, it's not important it's just something I noticed,

The word *just* frequently functions to underplay a statement to block criticism on the basis that it is not more, therefore revealing the assumption that others might expect more. This function of *just* is discussed at length elsewhere (Tannen, 1977). In the above example, S34 says that the point she has made is "just something I noticed"; the *just* follows a negative, as it often does: "it's not important." Both these traces reveal the expectation that anything worth mentioning in the narrative is important.

A number of subjects reveal the expectation that events be related in the story in the temporal order in which they occurred.[5]

S4 (33) ... Let's see is it while he's up in the ladder? or.. or before. ... UM--... anyway,

The *anyway* is a common type of evidence that an expectation is violated.[6] In this case it functions as an admission of defeat, at the same time that it marks the fact that an attempt was made to get the temporal order right. This speaker uses "anyway" in the same way later, and expresses the same expectation when she gives an excuse for putting something out of its temporal order. Like many other subjects, she mentions later in her story that a rooster was heard in the beginning of the film. Then she explains,

S4 (67) Anyway. ... I just remembered that. ... Anyway,

She seems to be saying, "I'm breaking the rules of storytelling a bit, but be indulgent. I tried." Another subject shows a similar concern with getting the temporal order of events right.

S39 (105) ... Came dow.. oh no, that didn't happen yet. ... So--... the sequence is funny... if you don't really... remember.

Moreover, the strength of this constraint is evidenced in the striking accuracy in all our narratives, both Greek and American, with regard to temporal sequence.

[5]We know from the work of Alton Becker that this is not so for members of Balinese or Javanese society.

[6]"Anyway" was investigated in an elicitation-of-interpretations format. Results are discussed in Tannen (1976) under the subheading taken from one respondent's apt characterization, "Sour Grapes Anyway."

WHAT'S IN A FILM?

The narratives in this sample constitute a special kind of storytelling; they are about events in a film. At least one subject commented about how it felt to be talking about a film in this setting.

S39 (22) ... so... it's very funny to make this telling.

We may assume that others felt "funny" about it as well, even if they did not say so, since when we tell each other about films we have seen, we usually do so for internally-generated reasons. Still, talking about films is a common practice in American and Greek society, and in these narratives, expectations about being subjects of an experiment clearly interplay with expectations about telling about movies.

The narratives of the American women contain more evidence of expectations about films as films than the Greek narratives. For example, nine Americans mention that the film contains no dialogue. As usual, the negative statement indicates that its affirmative was expected. Another way in which this film clearly did not adhere to subjects' expectations about films is with regard to its sound effects. Six American speakers mention the sounds in the film. For two of them, the sound track of the film is the theme which unifies their narratives, about which they adduce details, and which they return to repeatedly. Another subject, in fact, telling about the film a year after she first saw it, recalled this as the most salient feature of the film, even though she had not mentioned the sound at all the first time she told about it.

Three Americans devote a considerable amount of attention to this aspect of the film. One introduces it this way:

S37 (20) but there.. is... a lot of sound effects. ... Which are nŏt... totally UM--... consistent.

The *but* is another important kind of evidence of expectations. It marks the contrast with the expectation established by the preceding statement about there being no dialogue in the film.[7] Two other Americans say:

S44 (13) and the soŭnd is just... is... is really intensified /well/... from what.. it.. usually.. would be, I think.

S46 (22) ... And what I noticed... first off... was that all the noises in the movie,... were UM--... out of proportion.

The fact that these three subjects were particularly uncomfortable about the violation of this expectation about film sound tracks is marked in a number of ways. First of all, they continue to devote large portions of their narratives

[7]"But" as a denial of expectation signal is discussed in Lakoff (1971); its function in discourse is discussed in Tannen (1977).

to discussing it. Second, their statements are broken up by numerous pauses. Finally, and most obviously, judgment is implied in their choice of adjectives: "not consistent," "intensified," "out of proportion." Other subjects, however, mention this aspect of the film without implying judgment:

S4 (65) ... And the movie had a sound track. ... It's important.

S12 (2) The movie seemed very... sound oriented.

S4, still concerned with making it clear that she is adhering to the expectation that what she tells be important, notes that the sound track is "important" because it is unusual. Otherwise, one would assume that a movie has a sound track, and it would not be reportable. (Schank and Abelson would say that it is known by virtue of its inclusion in the "film script.")

American subjects reveal other expectations about verisimilitude in films. For example, one speaker comments on the quality of the color:

S24 (9) ... Something that I noticed about the /movie/ particularly unique was that the colors.. were... just... very strange.... Like... the green was a... inordinately bright green,... for the pears, .. and... these colors just seemed a little... kind of bold, almost to the point of... being artificial.

S24 assumes that the colors are not supposed to be "artificial," and she is making a judgment about the fact that they were. This is, again, a significant verbal act, and her raised amplitude reveals her emotional investment in the process ("very strange"), as well as the hedges ("just," "a little... kind of," "almost to the point of... being"). Another subject makes a similar judgment about the costumes.

S39 (45) ... And the people looked very funny, because they were suppo--sed,... to be--... far--mer--ish,... and really just had ... clothes like a person with like... store levis, and... a n--ew red bandana around his neck and a... things like

S39 expects the film to be realistic in its effects and considers it noteworthy that the characters' clothing seemed inauthentic to her. She is maintaining a "film-viewer" point of view, reporting the costumes as artifacts of the film, rather than simply describing them as clothes worn by people involved in the events she is reporting, as all the others who talk about clothing in fact do. Increased pitch and amplitude as well as elongated sounds and pauses also contribute to the denial-of-expectation implication of her statement; they connote surprise.

Films are expected to be internally consistent with regard to concrete details. Thus S34 was very troubled because she thought she detected a contradiction; she recalled seeing two baskets on the ground before the boy stole one, and then she recalled seeing two remaining. In fact, she made an

error. There were actually three baskets in the first place. However, her sense that the film was inconsistent was so disturbing to her that she spent a great deal of time talking about it in her initial narrative, and when she was asked to retell the narrative six weeks later, she again devoted a large portion of her story to discussing this detail.

Another expectation about films revealed in our narratives is related to its pace. Two subjects comment, with reference to a scene in which a man is picking pears,

S34 (29) .. There's nothing... doesn't seem to be very hurried. ... In the movie. It's fairly... slow,

S50 (21) ... A--nd... he's... it... the.. camera spends a lot of time watching him... pick these pears,

Again, they comment on the pace as an artifact of the film, not as a comment on the way the man is behaving, indicating that the speakers are in a film-description frame.

A final observation about film expectations entails that any character introduced in the film must play a role in the plot. Three Americans comment about a man who passes by with a goat, to the effect that he does not figure in the action. S24, for example, says that the man and goat

S24 (28) ... and just kind of walk off. They don't really seem to have too much to do,... with.. what's going.. on.

Again, the word *just* (in fact the almost formulaically common qualification-plus-hedge "just kind of") marks the expectation that MORE was expected. The implied judgment in the second part of the statement is again signaled by the clutch of hedges ("really," "seem," "too much") which soften the impact of the negative statement. Similarly, in another scene, a girl on a bicycle passes the boy on his bicycle. Two Americans indicate that the appearance of the girl had less significance than they expected of a character introduced into the film. In one case this is shown by the statement,

S39 (135) ... That was all that.. you saw of her in the movie.

In another it takes the form of a report of the viewer's thoughts:

S6 (78) ... a--nd UH--... you wonder how she's going to figure in on this.

FILM-VIEWER FRAME

This last example is an indication of another level of frame, closely related to that of the "film frame" we have been discussing. The speaker, S6, reports the events of the movie from her own point of view and therefore is characterizing

herself as a film viewer. She reveals her expectations of herself and how she interacts with the film. In the above example, she shows herself anticipating the events of the film before they occur, trying to "psych out" the strategy of the plot. This speaker does this a number of times in her narrative. Another instance is:

S6 (69) ..and you think "Aha. ... UH... Are we gonna go back to the man over there" but no.

Thus the interplay between her expectations and the events of the film are part of her narrative content. Her experience as a viewer is part of her story which therefore becomes a story not only of the movie but of her viewing of it as well.

This can be seen in another subject's conclusion of a particularly short and straightforward narrative:

S8 (59) And... yŏu're left with this dilemma, ... what does this guy [laugh] you know what does this guy really think.

S8, like nearly all our subjects, assumes that the pearpicker's thoughts are significant. She expresses this in terms of the expectation that the film should make clear the character's attitude toward the events of the film, so that uncertainty about that attitude becomes a "dilemma" for her as a viewer.

A similar point of view can be seen in S34:

S34 (24) I don't know what... I wasn't sure at first if they were apples, or if they were pears, but... UM... he's picking pears,

If the task is to describe what happened in the film, and if the speaker's conclusion is unquestionably that the man was picking pears, why does she report her initial uncertainty as to whether they were apples or pears? Her inclusion of this internal process of interpretation reflects her telling not only the story of the film, but the story of her experience watching it.

There are other examples of the "film-viewer frame." Perhaps one more aspect of it will suffice to indicate its function in the narratives. When a speaker reports her interpretation of the film, she necessarily characterizes herself as a film viewer. Therefore, for example, a speaker who reveals her expectation that an event in the film will have significance by saying that she thought the goat would eat the pears, follows this up with,

S39 (69) That's..I don't know whether you're supposed to think that or not.

Her *false start,* the *negative statement* about her own knowledge, and the *modal* all indicate her insecurity about the image she has presented of herself as a film viewer. The expectation is revealed that an adept viewer correctly interprets the actions of a film.

Strikingly, preoccupation with the film as a film and oneself as a film viewer is absent from the Greek narratives. No Greek speaker criticizes the film or

comments on it as a film in any way. The Greek narratives include no comment about the sound track, and no discussion of the speakers' anticipation of what would happen. In fact, fully half of the Greek subjects tell their entire narratives without ever making reference to the film as a film. Rather, they tell about the events directly. This is particularly noticeable in the beginning and end of their narrations, where there is the greatest likelihood in English narratives for the film to be mentioned as a film. For example, a typical beginning of a Greek narrative is:

G1 (1) *...e... to proto praghma pou eidha, ..itan ena pra--sino kataprasino topio,*
...e... the first thing that I saw, ..was a gree--n verygreen landscape,[8]

This narrative ends:

G1 (77) *etsi... menei aporimenos o--*
thus... (he) remains wondering the--

This is in contrast to such openings as "The film opened with..." or "The first scene showed...." While ten of the twenty Greek subjects make no reference at all to the fact that the events they are telling about occurred in a film, all twenty Americans make some allusion to it somewhere in their narratives, and most make much more than passing reference, as has been seen.

Of the ten Greek subjects who make some reference to the fact that they are talking about a film, only three actually mention the word "film" directly. Two of these mention it only once, in the first line of their narratives, and the third mentions it in both the first and the last lines. The other seven Greeks refer to it indirectly, generally through the verb *edheichne* or *dheichnei,* "(it) showed" or "it shows," in which the deleted subject is "the film."

This unmistakable difference between the points of view or frames of the Greek and American subjects seems to indicate that Americans are media-wise, or media-conscious, so their expectations about films and film-viewing are more developed and more salient to them. This tendency, however, to view the film as a film (or, put another way, to be conscious of the frame "film-watching") may be related to another striking difference between Greek and American narratives: the tendency of Greeks to interpret and make judgments about the events and people portrayed. While a number of Americans develop their narratives into extensions of the theme that the film had a strange soundtrack, a number of Greeks develop their narratives into extensions of some theme about the signicicance of the events in it. Thus,

[8]Greek transliteration will reflect Greek spelling as closely as possible. Translation will reflect syntax in the original whenever possible without making the meaning incomprehensible. The G# represents the subject number for Greek subjects.

Greeks are also seeing the film as a film, but they are interested in its "message" rather than its execution.

In order to illustrate this characteristic of the Greek narratives, I will translate the entire narrative of one speaker, eliminating pauses and other details of transcription so that the events can be followed easily. Although this is an extreme case, it dramatizes a tendency which is present to some extent in nearly all the Greek narratives. First of all, it is full of *interpretations* and *judgments*. Second, it is interesting to note which of the events of the film this speaker chooses to include in her story, and which she *omits*.

G12 From what I understood, it was an episode, it happened in Mexico. I suppose, the people seemed Mexican to me, and it showed the how a person was gathering pears, and it insisted that which he did, he was living. The in other words that he cultivated the earth, that he gathered these the harvest, was something special for him... it was worth something. He lived that which he did, he liked it. And it showed a scene-- it must have been the agricultural life of that region, someone who passed with a goat, a child a child with a bicycle, who saw the basket, with the pears, and took it, and then as he was passing, he met in the middle of the field, another girl with a bicycle, and as he looked at her, he didn't pay attention a little, and fell from him fell from him the basket with the pears, and there again were three other friends of his, who immediately helped him and this was anyway something that showed how children love each other, they have solidarity, they helped him to gather them, and and as he forgot his hat, there was a beautiful scene where he gave them the pears and returned it back again. In other words generally I think it was a scene from the agricultural life of the region it showed. That's it.

A vast array of interpretive devices are operating here to support G12's main idea: an all's'-right-with-the-world, romantic view of the meaning of the film. She discusses at length the pearpicker's attitude toward his work, as if it were known to her, yet it is clearly her own interpretation, as is her comment that the interaction between the boy and the three others who help him shows "how children love each other." These interpretations seem to be motivated by her own expectations about farmers and children. Similarly, her use of the adjective "beautiful" to describe the scene in which one boy gives the others some pears constitutes a judgment about the events. A process I have called *interpretive naming* can be seen in her reference to the three boys as "friends of his," without overtly marking that this is an interpretation, which it clearly is. Finally, to support her interpretation, G12 omits parts of the film that would suggest a less rosy picture of the world. For example, she is the only one

who actually omits to mention that the boy fell off his bicycle. She also omits the entire last scene in which the three boys pass by the tree where the man has discovered that his pears are missing. Moreover, she underplays the fact of the theft. Thus, the use of *interpretation* shapes this entire narrative in a way that it never does for our American subjects' narratives.

Such free use of interpretation first of all reveals a different attitude toward the activity of film-viewing and/or of being the subject of an experiment. It also yields an especially clear insight into the speaker's expectations. G12's idiosyncratic interpretation of the pearpicking film indicates her pastoral view of or expectations about farmers and children, which are part of a larger expectation about the romantic message of the film.

The tendency to approach the film for its "message" can be seen in other Greek narratives as well. For example, G6 ends by saying,

G6 (50) *...allo an /dhinei/ tora--... o kathenas alles erminies.*
... other if /gives/ now--... each (one) other interpretations.
[it's something else again if each person gives different interpretations]

Another subject indicates her expectation that she should be able to interpret the film by a negative statement which she in fact *repeats*.

G9 (107) *... tora to topio vevaia itan orai--o. ... alla dhen xero na to exighiso.*
... now the landscape certainly was lovely. ... but (I) don't know (how) to explain it.

After saying a few more sentences about the landscape, she says again, "but I don't know how to-- how to explain it."

Furthermore, while G12 was an extreme example of interpretive narration, other Greeks showed similar tendencies. For example, G11 says (again I will simply write the English translation to facilitate reading):

G11 ... (there) was a perso--n... a person of the earth. ... one of those who labor. ... a farmer, ... (he) was gathering--... (he) had worked-- the whole year, ... and (he) wanted to take his fruits. ... (he) was going up, (he) was going down, (he) was sweating, (he) was looking at .. EH with a devo--tion you know the pear... (he) was taking it (he) was putting it in the basket, ... (it) was falling down from him (he) was going down (he) was grasping it (he) was putting it back in the basket [sigh] ... very devoutly.

That the man was a farmer is *interpretive naming*; that he worked all year is an *inference* which contributes to the romantic interpretation of the farmer's relationship to his fruit. The speaker used the *katharevousa* word for "fruit,"

karpous, which is a more literary word, suggesting the notion "fruits of his labor" rather than simply "fruit" in the sense of "pears." She also *generalizes* the actions which occur once in the film and reports them as if they were done repeatedly, contributing to the interpretation of the farmer as a hardworking person. Even the speaker's intonation and her slow rate of speech conspire to create this effect. This personal view of the pearpicker surfaces at the end as well, where G11 reports his reaction to discovering that a basket is missing, from his point of view:

G11 (117).. *to allo ghemato pou einai?*
..the other full (one) where is (it)?

Finally, she infers his emotions at that point and repeats her inference, and switching to his point of view without marking the switch overtly.

G11 (119)... *TSK alla... moirolatrika to pire dhen boro-- na kano tipota tora pia. ... EH-- vlepei tous.. treis bobires pou troghane to--... achladhi,.. tous koitaze moirolatrika-- alla dhen boro na kano tipota allo*
... TSK but... fatefully (he) took it (I) can't-- do anything now anymore. ... EH-- (he) sees the.. three kids who were eating the--... pear,.. (he) was looking at them fatefully-- but (I) can't do anything else

"He took it fatefully" means something like, "He was philosophical about it." The speaker, however, seems to be characterizing her own view of life, or her expectation about farmers, rather than reporting what was actually dramatized in the movie.

Another Greek subject also interprets the pearpicker's actions at the end, although her interpretation is somewhat different. She also makes her identification with the man more immediate by assuming his point of view:

G16 (80) ... *dhen-- UH-- anti na tou pi-- na t na tou pi paidhia--einai ap ta achladhia ta opoia-- pithanon na echete pari eseis, ... ta vlepei, kai--... ta koitaei etsi me... choris na tous pi tipota, evg evghenika as poume tous ferthike, ... UH koitaxe, kai-- eidhe as poume oti-- troghan ta achladhia, kai--sa na efcharistithike/??/ kai dhen eipe tipota oti einai dhika mou ta achladhia afta,*
... (he) didn't--UH-- instead of telling them-- of of telling them children-- (they) are from the pears which-- possibly you have taken, ... (he) sees them, and--... (he) looks at them thus with... without telling them anything, ki kindly let's say (he) treated them,, ... UH (he) looked, and-- (he) saw let's say that-- (they) were eating the pears, and-- as if (he) was glad/??/ and (he) didn't say anything that these pears are mine,

G16 thus has interpreted that the man picking pears is glad to see the boys enjoying his pears, and that he treats them "kindly." The fact that she believes she should evaluate the film's message is seen, finally, in her following and last comment:

G16 (93) ... *ghenikos echei stoicheia etsi anthropias /alla/ synedh-iazmena kai me--... me ti... tha borouse perissotero na eiche as poume stin archi--*
... generally (it) has elements thus of humanism /but/ combined also with--... with what... (it) could have had more let's say in the beginning--

Thus G16 makes it explicit that her inferences about the pearpicker's attitude contribute to an interpretation of the message of the film. Her complaint about "what it could have had more," that is, "the more meaning it could have had" in the beginning, seems to refer to her dissatisfaction with the film's moral viewpoint at first. This may be related to her rather complex and clearly emotionally tinged complaint that the boy who had fallen off his bicycle should have thanked the three boys who helped him by giving them pears right away, instead of doing so only when they returned his hat to him, after he had been on his way already. In addition, it may refer to her interpretation of the same motions and expression of the pearpicker in the opening scene which led G12 to interpret that he revered his pears. G16 said,

G16 (3) ... *TSK kai-- ta mazevei-- etsi me--... me poli--... e-- sa na ta thelei dhika tou. me poli etsi-- /s/ idhioktisia dh dheichnei mesa.*
... TSK and-- (he) gathers them-- thus with--... with a lot-- ... EH-- as if (he) wants them (to be) his own. with a lot thus-- (of) /s/ proprietariness (it, he) sh shows inside.

With an equally free stroke, G16 interprets the pearpicker's motions as indicating possessiveness. These interpretations come from the same slow motions which led Americans to comment on the pace of the film.

Another example of the kind of interpretation found in the Greek but not the American narratives is G2's comment about the three boys' appearance:

G2 (46) ... *TSK... en to metaxi pros ironia... e pros ironia tis tychis*
... TSK... in the meantime by irony... EH by irony of luck

Like her judgment about the boy's failure to thank his helpers (a comment made by a number of other Greeks as well), her comment about luck's irony indicates she is regarding the events of the film as intrinsically significant rather than as events to remember for a memory task.

Finally, a number of Greek subjects show a pronounced inclination to philosophize about the film and its meaning after they have told it. G16 goes on after the interviewer has indicated satisfaction:

G16 It has such elements as, of course, and the young man who took the basket, I believe that he shouldn't have taken it, he took it at first, but then with the young men's deed who called to him and didn't ask, he gave them pears. And in the beginning the gentleman who was gathering pears took great care of them, this shows that man to be, that is, there are many contrasts in the film. Although in the beginning you believe that the child will give (them) pears, he goes away. But then after they give him the hat he changes his mind and gives them again. And the gentleman who was harvesting in the beginning and you thought that he was collecting them for himself and it shows a man but when he sees the children going away each holding a pear and sees that they are his and doesn't call them you see a conflict and you think it wasn't as I thought. It has many conflicts in it and--

ıst as this speaker goes on and on about the conflicts in the film, another one ɔntinues interminably about the pessimism of the film because it had a lot of lls in it!

It is clear then that the way in which the subjects talk about the film is aped by their notion of what constitutes appropriate comment about a film. mericans tended to operate from a film-viewer frame and criticize the film as lechnical product; Greeks tended to operate from a film-interpreter frame d expected the film to have a "message" which they proceeded to explain.[9]

EXPECTATIONS ABOUT EVENTS

: have seen many ways in which speakers reveal expectations about the ıtext and activity in which they are taking part. In addition, the way they cribe the events in the film indicates their expectations about specific nts portrayed in it.

'sonal Encounters

en a man with a goat walks by the tree where the man is picking pears, S6 cally reports,

S6 (20) And the man up in the tree doesn't even notice,

larly, when the boy comes by and takes a basket of pears, she says,

is tempting to hypothesize that this reflects a more general tendency of Greeks to ɔphize—an observation which coincides with my impressions during several years' ıce in Greece.

S6 (65) and the man up in the tree doesn't even... doesn't notice anything.

The negative statement, as has been seen repeatedly, indicates that an expected action failed to take place. The use of *even* intensifies this effect; it implies that "at least" this was expected and indicates surprise that it did not occur. In this case, the expectation is that when two people cross paths in a setting in which they are the only people present, they will notice and probably acknowledge each other. This shows up in another narrative this way:

S34 (43) ..And there doesn't seem there's no communication between the two of them, ...or anything,

Comments like these are frequent in both Greek and American narratives. They are even more frequent with regard to the passing of the boy on his bike than about the man passing with the goat. In the case of the boy coming by, the expectations about interactions dovetail with expectations about the theft. That is, in addition to an expectation that the man and the boy would interact, there is an assumption that in order for the boy to steal the pears, he must not be noticed by the man. Thus, mentions of the fact that the man did not notice the boy both mark a denial of expectation based on an interaction frame and also make explicit an element of a theft frame. For example, one subject says,

S44 (54) and the man doesn't know that the little boy is there.
(60) ...And like..so the man didn't hear the little boy,..you know...being there, ...and-- he--..ended up..UM--... swiping..one of his baskets of pears,

By juxtaposition, it is clear that the theft of the pears is seen as a consequence of the man's inattention. S6, the American who habitually verbalizes her expectations about the movie and plays them off against what actually happens, puts it this way:

S6 (30) ...At least..it seems to me that..you know he would notice this boy

The same idea is operating more subtly in the following statement:

S50 (67) ...But he's very brazen. I mean there's [o]..they're only about three feet apart.

The use of the *evaluative adjective* "brazen" and the word "only" both allude to the expectation that the man would notice the boy. These are two kinds of evidence of expectations. The second statement is, in effect, an explanation of the first. In fact, *adjectives* nearly always represent an interpretive or evaluative process on the part of the speaker at least in these narratives and probably in any storytelling event.

Confrontation

A related expectation about encounters between people which also overlaps with the theft frame can be seen in the way speakers describe the last scene in the film, in which the three boys pass the man who has just discovered that his pears are missing. S53 says,

> S53 (66) ...and he just kind of looks at them and...doesn't do anything.

There are a number of indications that the speaker expected a confrontation of some sort between the man and the passing boys. Once again, the word "just" and indeed the combination "just kind of," implies that MORE was expected. The increased pitch on "looks at them" also indicates surprise. Furthermore, the negative statement, "doesn't do anything," as has been seen so often, indicates that its affirmative was expected: he should have done something when the boys passed eating pears.

Another subject reveals the same expectation in this way:

> S49 (49) for some reason he didn't stop them or ask them where they got the pears.

Again, the negative statement indicates what S49 expected the man to do. Also, an increase in pitch and amplitude indicates surprise that this did not happen. Another example of the same expectation is in S50's account:

> S50 (171) and I thought maybe that there was going to be a big dramatic moment, where... he's going to accuse the little boys who'd actually been like..good Samaritans, of stealing the pears. ... But he just sort of watches them, ..as they walk by, and they don't pay any attention to them... to him, he's..they're just eating their pears,

There are numerous other similar examples in both the Greek and American narratives, all showing roughly the same pattern of evidence that a confrontation was expected when the boys passed the man. This is a good example of how structures of expectation overlap, for there are at least three contexts operating in this scene. For one thing, there is the situation of people passing each other in the country, and in this way this scene is similar to the ones already discussed in which the man passes with a goat and the boy passes on a bicycle. Second, the expectation of confrontation arises since the man has had his pears stolen, and the boys pass holding pears. Finally, this is a movie, and there is an expectation of a "climax" at the end of a film, as well as the expectation that something startling should happen somewhere in the film. This is what the subject seems to have in mind when she says "a big dramatic moment."

Accident Frame

A scene in the film that lends itself to interpretation is one in which the boy falls off his bicycle. Two sets of expectations come into play here: those about accidents and additionally and contrapuntally those about causality. There are noticeable differences between Greek and American narratives with regard to this scene.

The scene in which the boy falls off his bicycle is intentionally ambiguous. In the film, the following events are seen in the following order:

1. The boy is riding his bike.
2. A girl is riding her bike.
3. The boy and girl pass each other on their bikes.
4. The boy's hat flies off his head.
5. The boy turns his head backward.
6. A bicycle wheel is seen hitting a rock.
7. The boy is on the ground under his fallen bike.

The conclusion that the boy has fallen off his bicycle is drawn by everyone seeing this film. This is interpretive in some sense, since the boy is not actually seen falling off, but it is the only rational conclusion to be drawn from the juxtaposition of events in which the boy is riding his bike and is then seen on the ground under it. However, the reason for the boy's fall can be interpreted in a number of ways.

Some interpretation about the causality of the fall is made by all subjects in our sample. Theoretically, they could have simply reported that the boy fell without explaining why, but in fact no one does this. In keeping with the interpretive penchant of Greeks already noted, six Greek speakers explain the boy's fall from his bicycle by reference to events that did not actually appear in the film. In fact, they make *incorrect statements* in their explanations; the hypothesis, then, is that their interpretations came from their own expectations about what might cause a boy to fall off his bicycle.

Four Greeks say that the boy fell because the bicycles collided, and two others say that he fell during the "meeting" of the two bikes, implying but not stating that the bikes collided. No American makes such a statement. In general, the Greek explanations for why the boy fell are more varied than the American explanations. There is striking unanimity among Americans that the boy fell because his bike hit a rock. Fifteen say that he turned and hit a rock, while four say simply that he hit a rock. Only one makes an incorrect statement, saying that he fell because he was tipping his hat to the girl. By contrast, two Greeks say he fell because he was looking at the girl; four say he tripped on a rock; eight say he turned and then hit a rock; one says he was rushing; six, as we have seen, attribute the fall to a collision. Such explanations as "rushing" and "collision" clearly come from an accident

TABLE 1
Number of Subjects Mentioning Person and/or Objects

	English	Greek
Girl only	0	7
Rock only	0	2
Girl and hat	0	1
Girl, rock, hat	13	4
Girl and rock	7	6

frame, that is, the expectation that a bicycle accident might be caused in this way. The "tipping hat" explanation comes from the coincidence of an accident frame (not paying attention causes accident) and a greeting frame (boy meets girl and tips hat). Two Greeks but no Americans opt for the boy-meets-girl frame by itself as a cause (he fell because he was looking at the girl).

A pattern of interpretive omission can be seen here as well for the Greek subjects. Table 1 shows who and what got mentioned in the narratives. Thus, American subjects mentioned all three objects or two of them. Even if they did not include the girl in their explanation for the fall, yet they noted that she had appeared in the film. Greeks, however, more often than not, failed to mention all three objects which were portrayed in the fall sequence. It may be that their tendency to interpret events led them to a commitment to one interpretation of causality, and as a result to ignore objects or people that did not contribute to their interpretation. A total of nine Greek subjects (nearly half) mention only the person or object to which they are attributing causality.

While no Americans actually make the incorrect statement that the bikes collided, they are aware of this expectation. Two subjects make this overt:

> S6 (84) and you think "U?." You know "Are they going to collide,
> S24 (58) and you wonder if there's going to be a collision.... But.. instead they just.. kind of.. brush.. by each other

S24 exhibits the by now familiar set of cues marking denial of expectation: the use of "but," "just kind of," and the negative implied in "instead." "You wonder" is a variant of a negative for it states something that did not happen.

Another aspect of the accident frame has to do with the boys' emotions. Such elements as the characters' emotions and thoughts are necessarily interpretive, for the film does not represent these directly. S6 reports,

> S6 (109) .. He's kind of crushed, and I don't know... you know... I think his ego was hurt.

The hedges are a clue to the fact that she is stating something that is different in kind from a report of events directly witnessed.

Reaction to Theft

In the end of the film, the man discovers that a basket of pears is missing. Americans, even more than Greeks, tell what his emotions were when he made this discovery. Sixteen Americans and eleven Greeks mention the man's reactions, either by describing his actions or inferring his emotions.

Ten Americans and three Greeks report the man's actions; eight of these Americans and two of these Greeks mention that he counts the baskets (one Greek, by *generalization*, says that he "counts and counts again," generalizing the gesture of counting which was portrayed once in the film and thereby creating an effect of great perplexity on the part of the man). Most of the subjects in both groups who report the man's feelings say that he was puzzled or wondering (seven Americans, five Greeks). There is a difference, however, in what the others say. Two Americans say that he was angry or upset, while three Greeks say that he was surprised. That is, the deviant responses go in different directions; the Americans opt for a more intense negative reaction, and the Greeks go for a less negative one.

Then the three boys pass eating pears. Seventeen Americans and twelve Greeks report the man's reaction in some way. An equal number, roughly, say that he was puzzled or something similar (eight Americans and nine Greeks). One American and one Greek say that the man does not do anything (revealing the expectation that he would). Four Americans say that the man "just looks" at the boys, indicating by the "just" that they expected him to do more. Five Greeks say that he "doesn't say anything to them," implying that they expected him to say something.

These interpretive adjectives about the man's reaction when the boys pass with pears can only come from the expections of the speakers about how he should react, for the film does not show feelings.

EXPECTATIONS ABOUT OBJECTS

It has been seen that expectations can reflect assumptions about broad context and actions. In addition, we have expectations about specific activities and even objects. For example, the film shows a man in a tree picking pears. The film was shot in Briones Park, where there happened to be a single pear tree. Three Americans, in the beginning of their narratives, state that the film was set in an orchard. They *generalize*, it seems, based on their expectations that a pear tree would be in an orchard. In one case, we can practically see the inferential process by which one tree becomes an orchard:

> S37 (3-6) ... the-- landscape is like U--H a f--... sort of peasant landscape but it isn't really farmland, it's like an orchard. ... It's a small orchard,

From the approximation "like an orchard" comes the conclusion "it is an orchard." In a fourth narrative, the speaker reveals the same expectation by her *negative statement*.

S24 (6) it wasn't a pear orchard, ... or anything like that.

As usual, her statement of what it was not is evidence of an expectation that it should have been. This expectation operates for Americans but not for Greeks.

A similar pattern can be seen in mentions of the road in the film. Four Americans refer to it as a "dirt road," and a fifth calls it a "gravel path." Again, a negative statement and the use of "just sort of" are familiar signals:

S50 (72) this road that's... UH it's not paved, it's just sort of a dirt road,

Thus we have evidence that Americans expect roads to be paved. By contrast, only one Greek refers to the road as *"chomatodhromos,"* "a dirt road." It seems reasonable to attribute this difference to the greater likelihood of a road being unpaved in Greece. This pattern of evidence indicates again how the use of adjectives tends to be evaluative (in Labov's sense), that is, to reveal some expectations.

EVIDENCE OF EXPECTATIONS

Thus it has been shown that structures of expectation are constantly mediating between a person and her/his perceptions, and between those perceptions and the telling about them. These expectations operate on all levels, from the broad level of context and activity (interview, subject of experiment) to ideas about episodes and actions, to objects and people. The kinds of evidence that have been seen to reveal the existence of these expectations (or scripts or frames or schemata) will now be listed and exemplified briefly. The types of evidence I have looked at, listed roughly in order of the degree to which they depart from the material in the film, are[10]: (1) omission, (2) repetition, (3) false starts, (4) backtrack, (5) hedges and other qualifying words or expressions, (6) negatives, (7) contrastive connectives, (8) modals, (9) inexact statements, (10) generalization, (11) inference, (12) evaluative language, (13) interpretation (14) moral judgment, (15) incorrect statements, (16) addition.

[10]It is clear that paralinguistic and prosodic features such as raised pitch and amplitude and drawn-out vowels also function as expectation evidence, and I have considered them in my discussion. However, I have not studied these in depth and therefore limit this list to strictly linguistic features.

1. Omission

A narrator cannot recount every detail. Some things are necessarily omitted. However, omissions can indicate expectations, especially when contrasted with what is included by other speakers. This was seen in the narrative of G12 who omitted events that would have contradicted her optimistic interpretation. One more example can be seen in the way in which reference is made to the man who passes with a goat. All Americans who mention this man refer to him as a man with a goat. In contrast, three of the fourteen Greeks who mention this man omit to mention that he had a goat with him. The conclusion suggested is that it is less remarkable, less unexpected, for Greeks that a passing man should be leading a goat. In Schank and Abelson's terms, the goat is in the Greeks' script for passing country person. For Americans, however, the goat is unexpected and therefore reportable. We may say that the Greeks omitted to mention the goat and thereby revealed something about their expectations.

2. Repetition

Repetition is another element that does not violate the reality of the events in the film but is nonetheless a departure from straight narrative syntax. Labov (1972) has shown that repetition can be an effective device in making "the point" of a story.

There are at least three different types of repetition: false starts (which will be discussed under that heading), linking (which seems to be a time-filler), and repetition of complete statements. The third type, which we will be concerned with, can take the form of (a) identical or changed wording and (b) immediate or later restatement.

An immediate repetition, like a linking repetition, can be a stalling mechanism, especially when it is uttered at a slowed pace, with elongations of syllables and pauses, and with clause final intonation at the end:

G18 (106) *kai ta paidhakia synechisane to dhromo.... synechisane--*
... to dhromo,
and the children continued the road.... (they) continued--
... the road,

When a repetition comes after some intervening commentary, however, it generally underlines a key phrase or idea which constitutes a kind of frame evidence:

G11 (119) *... TSK alla... moirolatrika to pire*
(124) *tous koitaze moirolatrika--*
(119) ... TSK but... fatefully (he) took it
(124) (he) looked at them fatefully--

This reemphasis indicates the speaker's main interpretation of the film which, as has been seen, comes from her own expectations about the pearpicker's point of view. Repetition, then, is closely related to the phenomenon of reportability which is a direct function of unexpectedness.

3. False Starts

There are a number of types of false starts; the most significant in terms of discovering frames is a type I have dubbed "contentful." That is an instance of a statement being made or begun and then immediately repudiated or changed. For example, G11 said of the boy,

G11 (113) *synantise... ochi dhen synantise tipota allo,*
(he) met... no (he) didn't meet anything else,

The speaker began to say, incorrectly, that the boy met someone else, revealing her expectation that the story would continue with another meeting.

An expectation about conversational coherence can be seen in a false start in which "and" is switched to "but."

G14 (20) *...kai-- alla-- meta to-- /s/kaloskeftike,*
...and-- but-- then (he) thought better of it--,

The fact that G14 began by saying "and" indicates the expectation that the following statement would be consonant with the preceding one, a basic assumption about narrative connections.

4. Backtrack

A backtrack represents a break in temporal or causal sequentiality, a disturbance in the narrative flow. A temporal backtrack returns to an event that occurred earlier than the one just stated. A causal backtrack is an interruption for the purpose of filling in background information.

An example of a temporal backtrack can be seen when a Greek subject introduces her narrative, tells of the pearpicker, and then says,

G9 (9) *.../a/ stin archi archi omos EH-- lalisan kati-- koko--ri.*
.../a/ in the beginning beginning however EH-- crowed some-- roo--ster.

The co-occurrence of a falst start, elongations of sounds, and a filler (EH--) with a backtrack is frequent. A mistake has been made, and the backtrack constitutes a correction. Therefore there are numerous traces of the speaker's discomfort. In the above example, the backtrack reflects the realization of a violation of the expectation that the narrative adhere to temporal constraints,

at the same time that it reflects the speaker's subject-of-experiment expectation that she tell as much as she can recall.

A causal backtrack supplies information that was not included at first (we might say it was assumed as part of the script) but is later considered needed.

G18 (57) *kai-- epese-- m-- meta to paidhi opos pighaine brosta dhen eidhe kala, ... kai tou epese-- m-- TSK tou pesane ta frouta kato.*
and-- (he) fell-- m-- then the child as (he) was going forward didn't see well, ... and (from) him fell-- m-- TSK (from) him fell the fruit down.

G18 apparently began to say that the child fell, but then she felt that it was appropriate to explain why he fell, and finally she decided that the important fact was that the fruit fell to the ground. The backtrack shows her awareness of the expectation that causality be explained. The beginning of her utterance, "and-- (he) fell--" constitutes a false start, but in this case it is the content of the replacing statement rather than the content of the repudiated statement which is of interest.

5. Hedges and Hedgelike Words or Phrases

There are numerous words and phrases that may be classed as hedges or hedgelike. By qualifying or modifying a word or statement, hedges measure the word or idea against what is expected. They caution: "not so much as you might have expected." To consider all hedges would be a mammoth study in itself. They include such expressions as: really, anyway, just, obviously, even, kind of. Examples discussed in the preceding text are such words as "anyway" and "just."

Let us look at one other example. Following are the sentences from one narrative that contain the word "even."

S6 (20) And the man up in the tree doesn't even notice.
(65) and the man up in the tree doesn't even... doesn't notice anything.
(142) He doesn't.. he doesn't even notice that the pears are stolen yet.

(20) refers to the pearpicker not noticing the goatman go by. (65) refers to his not noticing the boy make off with the pears. In all three cases, there seems to be an element of surprise that the man did not notice what was happening. "Even" implies that this would be the least one might expect. The frame, then, calls for people to notice what is happening around them. "Even" intensifies the effect of the negative statement. As with "just kind of," "doesn't even" seems to be almost formulaic, as is seen in (65) where it contains a false start as well.

6. Negatives

Numerous examples of negatives have been discussed (p. 147). In general, a negative statement is made only when its affirmative was expected.

One of the most consistently reappearing negative statements refers to the fact that the man picking pears is not watching the boy who steals a basket from him. Ten American subjects make some negative statement about this, such as was seen in the previous example from S6 (65). As stated above, this reflects an interaction frame. However, it is stated by so many speakers because it is also a necessary part of the theft frame: that is, there is a scenario for a theft that includes the thief not being noticed by the victim. The theft frame will be investigated in detail in the last section of this chapter.

7. Contrastive Connectives

I have shown (Tannen, 1977) that an oral narrative uses the word "but" to mark the denial of an expectation not only of the preceding clause (Lakoff, 1971) but of an entire preceding set of statements or of narrative coherence in general. Thus in Greek, the word *alla* ("but") is often used to introduce a new scene in the narratives, in accordance with the expectation that things continue as they are unless otherwise marked. There is also an expectation that when people turn to leave, they continue on their way: a leaving frame. Thus when in the film the three boys interrupt their departure and turn back because they found the bicycle boy's hat on the ground, the fact that they found his hat is introduced by the word *alla* in the narratives of eight Greek subjects. Thus it has been seen that the word "but" often introduces a negative statement or, as in the following example, follows a negative.

G18 (46) ...*kathondas*... *kai-- mallista dhen kathise sti thesi tou,* ... *alla kathise-- m--*... *brosta brosta sto podhilato.*
...sitting... and-- indeed (he) didn't sit in his seat, ...but (he) sat-- m-- way up front on the bicycle.

A bike-riding frame leads one to assume that a boy sits on the seat of his bike. This subject pointed out a departure from the frame: the boy did not sit on the seat. No one else made this observation, perhaps because the same frame led them to make an inference. I, for example, assumed that although the film showed the boy standing on the pedals and leaning forward as he mounted the bike, that he would immediately sit down on the seat when he got out of camera range. My own expectations about bike riding led me to assume that.

8. Modals

Modals are relatively infrequent in narratives since they make statements which are not directly narrative. "Must," "should," and Greek *prepei* reflect the speaker's judgment according to her own standards and experience. "May," "can," and Greek *borei* measure what happened against what is possible. The most frequent modal construction in the present data is the type that marks inferences of the form "must have been."

G13 (3) ...*tha prepei na epine krasi ghiati itan poli kokkinos,*
...(he) must have drunk a lot of wine because (he) was very red,

The use of *prepei* ("must have") overtly marks the fact that G13 is making an inference. It has already been seen that inferences represent evidence of structures of expectation.

Two other instances of modals reflect the judgment that the boy should have given the three helpers pears earlier than he did. Two others indicate interpretation of the future, which can only be based on expectations (that is, that the farmer will fill the third basket with pears). Finally, "can" is used twice to describe ability, which must be an inference since it cannot be observed from the outside.

G14 (17) ...*borouse na to sikosi aneta aftos o mikros.*
...this little boy could lift it easily.

The mention of the boy's ability indicates that G14 did not expect him to be able to lift a whole basket of pears.

9. Inexact Statements

Inexact statements are not like interpretations and inferences, for they relate what was in fact shown in the film, but they do not report events precisely as they occurred. Rather, they are fuzzy or slightly altered.

The greatest number of inexact statements about a single episode are about the fall (pp. 163–165), as, for example, when the boy is said to have fallen during his meeting with the girl.

Another common type of inexact statement represents a kind of collapsing of events into a significant kernel. For example, in the film the boy gives three pears to one of the three boys who helped him, and that boy then distributes one pear to each of this friends. Some subjects explain this in just this way. However, some others say something like,

G2 (45) *tous edhose ta tria achladhia*
(he) gave them the three pears

That is, the events are collapsed to convey the significant outcome: the three boys ended up with the pears. The mechanics of their distribution is not seen as significant, since the entire event is grouped under the heading of a giving frame. The frame, by its definition, operates as a selection process, determining which details are significant.

Finally, by the same process, the "name of the frame" can influence the ategorization of actions within it, causing them to be represented inexactly. 'or example, since the film about the pears has no dialogue, when the boys vish to get the attention of the other boy who is walking away with his bike in rder to return his hat to him, one of the threesome is seen to whistle, and the ound of a whistle is heard. Yet one subject reports,

G14 (59) ... *kai-- tou-- fonaxe enas-- o allos*
... and-- (to) him-- called a-- the other [and the other one called to him]

Thus the action of "whistling" becomes "calling." The word "called" is used utomatically to describe the action of getting the boy's attention because an ttention-getting frame is thought of as "calling." Put another way, it may be aid that calling is the prototypical way of getting someone's attention.

10. Generalization

Closely related to inexact statements is the process of generalization or multiplication by which one object or action is reported as more than one. This may reflect the nature of art, in this case the movie, in which a single instance is understood to represent multiple instances. It is furthermore intriguing to speculate that the phenomenon supports Bartlett's hypothesis of constructive memory, by which memory is seen as a process of storing individual images and recalling them as representative of numerous instances, based on structures of expectation.

Generalization has been seen in the tendency for the lone pear tree to be recalled as being in an orchard (pp. 165-166), and for activities depicted once in the film to be recalled as repeated actions. For example, the man in the tree is shown climbing down the ladder. The single descent is taken to represent repeated descents:

G14 (8) ... *kai katevaine kathe toso,*
... and (he) was coming down every now and then,

Another subject makes the same generalization and creates the effect of repeated actions through her intonation combined with the past continuous tense:

G11 (8) ... *anevaine, katevaine, ydhrone,*
... (he) was going up, (he) was coming down, (he) was sweating,

The knowledge that fruitpicking necessitates numerous trips up and down clearly triggered this generalization.

11. Inferences

Inferences are statements which could not be known simply from observation of the film, as for example when subjects report characters' thoughts, feelings, and motivations. Thus when G10 said that the man on the ladder "was afraid of falling," she was saying more about her own expectations of what a man on a ladder would feel than about what the film showed.

Inferences about why the boy fell off his bicycle have been discussed at length (pp. 163-165). That the boy loses his hat and turns his head back is a fact, but that he turns to look at the girl is an inference. While six Greek subjects make this inference, two Greeks and three Americans say that he turned to look at his hat, and two Greeks and four Americans say that he looked, without saying at what. One subject makes both inferences:

S24 (62) he's.. UM ... kind of looking back ... at her.. and the hat,

In general, speakers state inferences as categorically as they state things they actually saw. In other words they believe they saw what they expect to have been the case, based on what they saw combined with what they know of the world.

12. Evaluative Language

I have so far distinguished three types of evaluative language: (a) adjectives, (b) adverbs, and (c) adverbs whose domain is an entire episode.

Adjectives are used to describe setting, people, and objects. They actually occur rather infrequently in narrative (cf. Labov). When they do occur, however, the fact that the speaker chose that quality to comment upon is significant, and more often than not, the quality expressed reveals some comparison with what might have been expected. For example, a Greek woman calls the pearpicker *psilos* ("tall") while no American does. This may well reflect some framelike notion of how tall a person ordinarily is. Similarly, a Greek subject calls the setting,

G1 (2) *ena pra--sino kataprasino topio*
a gree--n verygreen landscape

The second adjective, "verygreen," seems to reflect an impression that the landscape is greener than might be expected (it is, in comparison to Greek landscapes). In general, the assignment of values like "tall," "big," and "very" anything are the result of some evaluative process on the part of the speaker. First, these qualities are not absolute in the sense that a man can be called a man or a tree a tree, and second, the fact that they are singled out for mention must be accounted for.

Adverbs describe the way in which something was done, and such description reflects a distinctly evaluative process. For example, one Greek subject says that the three boys at the end walk past the pearpicker in this way:

G8 (61) *kai troghane amerimna ta achladhia min xerontas oti itan klemmena.*
and (they) were eating carelessly the pears not knowing that (they) were stolen.

The comment that the boys were eating the pears "carelessly" (or "indifferently") indicates some contrast with another way they might have been behaving: in particular, that those who are in possession of stolen goods would be nervous. The inclusion of the adverb measures the boys' behavior against expected behavior for people in their position.

Adverbs such as "suddenly" or "luckily" are often used to introduce new episodes. They indicate the speaker's attitude toward the event about to be reported and how it relates to those that have already been told. For example, in Greek, *etyche*, which corresponds to English "(he) happened to," is used a number of times. This word is related to the word *tychi*, "luck," so that its meaning is something like, "as luck would have it."

G3 (42) *etyche ekeini tin ora na katevainei o-- erghatis apo ti-- skala,*
(at) that time the-- worker happened to come down from the ladder,

Etyche comments on the unexpectedness of the event, that is, for the victim to cross paths with the possessors of the goods stolen from him.

13. Interpretation

Interpretation is similar to evaluation and inference, but it is a bit further removed from the events depicted in the film. It has already been seen (pp. 156-160) that in our sample, Greek subjects exhibited more inclination to interpret events than Americans.

Interpretive naming is the process by which a noun is used for a character or object which represents more information than the film presented. This was seen (p. 156) when the three boys were called "friends" of the other boy. In a more frequent example, if a speaker calls the man who is picking pears simply "a man," she is not imposing any more information abouthim than that which is obvious to anyone. However, if she calls him a "farmer" or "worker," she is imposing her knowledge of the world and expectations about picking activities and the people who engage in fruitpicking.

A final example of interpretation can be seen in the exchange of pears scene, in which the boy with the bicycle gives three pears to one of the other boys after that boy has returned his hat to him. Generally, Americans tend to report the exchange without comment while Greeks tend to interpret the giving of pears as a gesture of thanks. This interpretation depends upon expectations based on a helping frame. One Greek does not mention the exchange as such but indexes it for its significance alone, saying simply that the boy "thanked" the threesome. Thus interpretation can substitute for events.

14. Moral Judgment

Moral judgments are the first of the last three types of evidence which come entirely from the speaker's frames or knowledge of the world and are imposed on the events of the film. A number of Greek subjects, for example, comment that the boy should have given some pears to the three boys who helped him earlier than he did. One American does this as well:

S6 (122) ...UM--...I thought why didn't he think of it before.

A moral judgment is often emotionally charged, sometimes accompanied by much verbal fussing, as can be seen in G16's account:

G16 (40) *kai-- tote to paidhi, ..katalavainei stin /a/ eno eprepe kanonika-- otan to voithisan na dhos na-- ton voithisan na ta-- dhos ta achladhia pa na ta vali sti thesi tous, eprepe kanonika...na dhosi na prosferi EH--na--...se ol se osa paidhia itane na prosferi-- ligha achladhia, kai dhen prosfere. ...alla otan eidhe na tou xanapighan ton fonaxan ghia na-- tou pane to kapello, ...tote sa na katalave oti-- eprepe na prosferi stin archi,...kai prosfere meta ap afti ti cheironomia pou to xanafonaxan ghia to-- na tou dhosoun to kapello tou. ...kai-- archizei kai moirazei apo ena achladhi sto kathe paidhi.*

and-- then the child, ..realizes in the /beg/ while (he) should have ordinarily--when (they) helped him to give to-- (they) helped him to give the-- them the pears (he) goes to put them in their place, (he) should have ordinarily...given offered EH-- to--...to al to as many children as there were to offer-- a few pears, and (he) didn't offer. ...but when (he) saw them bring him back (they) called him to-- give him the hat, ...then as if (he) realized that-- (he) should have offered in the beginning, ...and (he) offered after this gesture that (they) called him back for the-- in order to give him his hat. ...and-- (he) starts to distribute one pear each to each child.

The passage is confusing because of the plethora of interruptions, backtracks, false starts, hesitations, elongations of sounds, and repetitions. All of these evidence the speaker's strong feelings about her moral judgment.

A moral judgment can be much more subtle, as for example when an American commented that the pears the boy gave to the three helpers "weren't the best of the bunch," implying a negative judgment about his character.

15. Incorrect Statement

Incorrect statements represent false recollections. For example, one Greek subject refers to the boy among the threesome who is the most prominent in the action as the tallest. In fact he is not the tallest. Her incorrect recall seems to reflect her preconception about "leaders" (the very idea that this boy is the "leader" is an interpretation which is made overt by at least one other Greek subject who calls him *archighos*).

A number of incorrect statements were seen in connection with the boy falling off his bicycle (p. 163). Another expectation shows through the incorrect statement by a number of subjects that the boy remounts his bike after the accident. This recollection can only come from the speakers' expectations, for in the film the boy walks off with the bike. One subject even extends the image of the three boys helping:

G20 (42) *to voithisane na anevi-- pali sto podhilato,*
(they) helped him to get up-- again on the bicycle,

Sometimes the speaker is aware that there is something wrong with her recall; sometimes she corrects herself, and sometimes she opts for the incorrect version.

G1 (46) *... UH... kai n'anevi pali sto po.. ochi... nai.*
...UH... and to get up again on the bi.. no... yes.

Two other strikingly similar accounts illustrate that the incorrect statement is simply a more extreme manifestation of the operation of expectations which in other cases result in negative statements.

G9 (79) *... EH-- kai anevike to aghoraki pano s ochi dhen anevike sto podhilato,*
... EH-- and the littleboy got up on no (he) didn't get up on the bicycle,

G18 (89) *kai anevike to paidhi epano sto ochi dhen anevike sto podhilato,*
and the child got up on the no (he) didn't get up on the bicycle,

16. Addition

The most extreme evidence of a speaker's expectations lies in the process of addition: the mention of a character or episode that was not in the film at all. For example, one Greek subject introduced the three boys this way:

G21 (83) *... e--keini tin ora, edheixe-- ... TSK mia ghynaika,... itan dhyo ghynaike... mia ghynaika me tria paidhia,*
...(at) tha--t time, (it) showed--... TSK a woman, (there) were two wome,... a woman with three children,

There was no woman in the film. The appearance of the woman, therefore, evidences an expectation on the part of G21 that children in the road would be accompanied by a woman—or two!

In some cases, as with incorrect statements, the speaker questions her recollection, but she may still opt for the incorrect one:

G18 (11) *... EH-- sto dhromo omos, ... E--M... pou pighaine, synantise... ochi dhe synantise tipota allo, ... nai. epighe ekei, kai-- m--... TSK itan aftos o-- meta pighe ena koritsaki, ... sto dhromo pou pairnousan ta dhyo podhilata, synantise ena allo koritsaki,*
... EH-- on the way however, ... E--M... where he was going, (he) met... no (he) didn't meet anything else, ... yes (he) went there, and-- m--... TSK (it) was this-- then a littlegirl was going, ... on the road where the two bicycles were passing, (he) met another littlegirl,

As with previous examples, there are numerous verbal cues that the speaker is unsure of what she is saying. Yet once she commits herself to the assertion that the boy met another girl, she repeats it, as if to reassure herself. Through the process of generalization, that is, of reduplicating what was a single instance, G18 builds upon what she did see to add something she did not, based on her expectations of what would have been likely, had the film contained more. In fact, as will be seen in the final section, she goes on to say that the second girl was going to steal pears.

WHAT'S IN A THEFT?

In the discussion so far I have indicated a number of levels of expectations, ranging from interactional context to objects, and I have shown various kinds of linguistic evidence for these expectations, ranging from omissions and additions to false starts and raised pitch. Another way to approach frames or

TABLE 2
Number of Mentions of Actions Relating to Theft by Greeks and Americans

Action	Greeks	Americans
Thief enters	19	20
Thief stops	4	12
Victim not paying attention	6	10
Thief sees victim's inattention	10	8
Thief decides to take goods	3	14
Thief takes goods	19	16
Thief puts goods on vehicle	14	12
Thief leaves	15	17
Victim returns to scene	16	18
Victim discovers theft	14	19
Victim reacts	11	18

sets of expectations may be to look at which elements in a set of actions are chosen for mention by a large number of speakers. In order to see how this operates for one set of events, I noted all mentions of all activities relating to the theft. In all, thirty different actions were mentioned by at least one speaker. Of these, only eleven actions were mentioned by more than ten speakers in either group (Greeks or Americans). A list of these eleven (see Table 2), then, constitute a profile of the most salient parts of a theft frame. The number of subjects who mentioned each action gives an indication of the relative salience of each action. Only 16 Americans directly state that the boy takes the pears. The four others say this indirectly by stating he decided to take them and leaving it at that.

OTHER EFFECTS OF THEFT THEME

The fact that the film centers around a theft has effects on how other events in it are told; in a way, the theft theme diffuses. For example, after telling that a man passed (the goatman), one Greek subject said,

G16 (9) *dhen vazei dhen--... ...thelei tipota na k pari apo afta.*
(he) doesn't put (he) doesn't--... ...want to st take from them.

The negative statement, as usual, prompts the question why she would tell what the man did NOT want. She even begins, apparently, to say "he doesn't want to *steal* any," as she utters the false start "k," probably from "*klepsi*," "steal". It seems likely that she had in mind the subsequent act by the boy. Similarly, the Greek speaker who added a second girl passing on the road after the accident scene, then inferred from her own false recall that this girl also wanted to take some pears.

G18 (120) *synantise ena allo koritsaki, ..to opoio pighaine-- ekei fainetai na pari kai afto-- ...frouta.*
(he) met another littlegirl, ...who was going-- there (it) seems to take fruit too.

More subtly, another Greek describes the boy leaving the place where the farmer was up in the tree "quickly" (*ghrighora*). Again, the adverb attributes a quality to the boy's action which is furnished by the speaker's expectations about how a person leaves the scene of mischief.

CONCLUSION

I have shown that the notions of script, frame, and schema can be understood as structures of expectation based on past experience, and that these structures can be seen in the surface linguistic form of the sentences of a narrative. Furthermore, the structures of expectation which help us process and comprehend stories serve to filter and shape perception. That is why close analysis of the kinds of linguistic evidence I have suggested can reveal the expectations or frames which create them.

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